We consider the problem of fair two-party computation, where fairness (informally) means that both parties should learn the correct output. A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) shows that fairness is, in general, impossible to achieve for malicious parties. Here, we treat the parties as rational and seek to understand what can be done.
Introduction
Cryptography and game theory are both concerned with understanding interactions between mutually distrusting parties with potentially conflicting interests. Cryptography typically adopts a "worst case" viewpoint; that is, cryptographic protocols are designed to protect the interests of each party against arbitrary (i.e., malicious) behavior of the other parties. The game-theoretic perspective, however, views parties as being rational ; game-theoretic protocols, therefore, only need to protect against rational deviations by other parties.
Significant effort has recently been devoted to bridging cryptography and game theory; see [9, 21] for surveys. This work has tended to focus on two general sets of questions:
"Using cryptography to implement games" (e.g., [7, 10, 4, 8, 25, 1, 19] ). Given a game that is played by parties relying an external trusted entity (a mediator ), when can the mediator be replaced by a cryptographic protocol executed by the parties themselves?
"Applying game-theoretic analysis to cryptographic protocols" (e.g., [17, 21, 13, 26, 1, 15, 16] ). What game-theoretic definitions are appropriate for computationally bounded, rational players executing some protocol? Can impossibility results in the cryptographic setting be circumvented if we are willing to take a game-theoretic approach?
Here, we turn our attention to the question of fair two-party computation in a rational setting, where fairness means that both parties should learn the value of some function f evaluated on the two parties' inputs. Following recent work of Asharov et al. [2] (see further below), our goal is to understand when fairness is achievable by rational parties running some cryptographic protocol, without the aid of any external trusted entity. Our work touches on both the issues outlined above. Our motivation was to circumvent the strong impossibility result of Cleve [6] for fair two-party computation in a malicious setting. In this sense, our work is a significant generalization of results on rational secret sharing [17, 13, 26, 1, 22, 23, 29, 27, 3, 11] , which can be seen as a special case of fair computation for a specific function with parties' inputs provided by a trusted dealer. But it is also possible to view the problem of rational fair computation from a different perspective. Specifically, one could define a natural "fairness game" involving a trusted mediator who computes a function f on behalf of the parties (and gives both parties the result), and where parties can choose whether or not to participate and, if so, what input to send to the mediator. One can then ask whether there exists a real-world protocol (replacing the mediator) that preserves certain equilibrium properties of the original mediated game. Our work demonstrates a close connection between these two complementary viewpoints; see further in the next section.
Our Results
Our setting is the same as that studied by Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay [2] . Informally, there are two parties P 0 and P 1 who wish to compute a function f of their respective inputs x 0 and x 1 , where the distributions of x 0 and x 1 are common knowledge. (In [2] independent uniform distributions were assumed but we consider an arbitrary joint distribution.) Following work on rational secret sharing, the parties' utilities are such that each party prefers to learn the correct answer f (x 0 , x 1 ) and otherwise prefers that the other party outputs an incorrect answer. Informally, a cryptographic protocol computing f is fair if having both parties run the protocol is a (computational) Nash equilibrium with respect to fail-stop deviations. 1 (I.e., it is assumed that parties may abort the protocol early, but cannot otherwise deviate from the protocol.)
The primary result of Asharov et al. in this context is a negative one: they show a function f , a pair of distributions on the inputs, and a set of utilities for which there is no fair protocol computing f that has correctness better than 1/2. The suggested implication of their result was that the power of rational fair computation is relatively limited.
Looking more closely at the impossibility result or Asharov et al., we observe that for their specific choices of f , the input distributions, and utility functions, the parties have no incentive to run a protocol at all! Namely, the utility each party obtains by running any protocol that correctly (and fairly) computes f is equal to the expected utility that each party obtains if it simply guesses the input of the other party and computes the function on its own (without any interaction). 2 A cleaner way of stating this is that even in an ideal world where there is a trusted entity computing f with complete fairness, the parties would be indifferent between using the trusted entity or not. In game-theoretic terms, computing f in this ideal world is not a strict Nash equilibrium for the specific setting considered in [2] . Thus, if running a (real-world) protocol incurs any cost at all, there is a priori no hope that parties will prefer to run any protocol for computing f ! It seems, then, that the impossibility result of Asharov et al. for rational fair computation is not due to some inherent limits of rational fairness, but is instead due to the specific function, the specific input distributions, and the specific utilities chosen by Asharov et al. In this work, we ask: are there settings where rational fair computation (with complete correctness) is possible? Assuming the existence of (standard) secure computation, we show a strong, general result for when this is the case: In addition to the fact that we show a positive result, our work goes beyond the setting considered in [2] in several respects: we handle (deterministic) functions over arbitrary domains where parties possibly receive different outputs, and treat arbitrary distributions over the parties' inputs. (In [2] , only single-output functions under independent and uniform input distributions were considered.) Moreover, our results can be extended to handle the Byzantine setting where, in particular, parties have the option of changing their inputs; Asharov et al. [2] only treat the fail-stop case.
Other Related Work
The most relevant prior work is that of Asharov et al. [2] , already discussed extensively above. Here we merely add that the primary focus of Asharov et al. was not to circumvent cryptographic impossibility results, but rather to develop formal definitions of various cryptographic goals (with fairness being only one of these) in a game-theoretic context. Their paper takes an important step toward that worthy goal. 1 We will consider Byzantine deviations as well, but stick to fail-stop deviations here for simplicity. 2 Specifically, using the input distributions and utility functions from [2] , P 0 's utility if both parties (run some protocol and) output the correct answer is 0, whereas if both parties guess then each party is (independently) correct with probability 1/2 and so the expected utility of P 0 is As observed earlier, work on rational secret sharing [17, 13, 26, 1, 22, 23, 29, 27, 3, 11] can be viewed as a special case of fair secure computation, where the function being computed is the reconstruction function of the secret sharing scheme being used, and the parties inputs are generated by a dealer. Our results would give rational secret-sharing protocols where following the protocol is a (computational) Nash equilibrium. In contrast, most of the work on rational secret sharing has focused on achieving stronger equilibrium notions, in part because constructing Nash protocols for rational secret sharing is trivial in the multi-party setting. (We stress that in the two-party setting we consider here, constructing Nash protocols for rational secret sharing is not trivial.) We leave for future work consideration of stronger equilibrium notions for rational fair computation of general functions.
An analogue of our results is given by work of Izmalkov et al. [24, 25, 20, 18] who, essentially, also show protocols for rational fair computation whenever parties would prefer to compute the function in the ideal world. The main difference is that we work in the cryptographic setting where parties communicate using standard channels, whereas the protocols of Izmalkov et al. require strong physical assumptions such as secure envelopes and ballot boxes.
There has recently been a significant amount of work on fairness in the cryptographic setting, showing functions that can be computed with complete fairness [12] and exploring various notions of partial fairness (see [14] and references therein). The relationship between complete fairness and rational fairness is not obvious and, in particular, completely fair protocols are not necessarily rationally fair: if the distributions and utilities are such that aborting is preferable even in the ideal world then no protocol can be rationally fair (with respect to the same distributions and utilities) in the real world. In any case, relatively few functions are known that can be computed with complete fairness. Partial fairness is similarly incomparable to rational fairness.
Model and Definitions
Given a deterministic function f : X × Y → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , we let f 0 (resp., f 1 ) denote the first (resp., second) output of f , so that f (x, y) = (f 0 (x, y), f 1 (x, y)). We consider two settings where parties P 0 and P 1 wish to compute f on their respective inputs x 0 and x 1 , with P 0 receiving f 0 (x 0 , x 1 ) and P 1 receiving f 1 (x 0 , x 1 ): an ideal world computation of f using a trusted third party, and a real-world computation of f using some protocol Π. In each setting, x 0 and x 1 are chosen according to some joint probability distribution D, and in each setting we consider both fail-stop and Byzantine strategies.
The output of P 0 is correct if it is equal to f 0 (x 0 , x 1 ) and incorrect otherwise; this is defined analogously for P 1 . The utilities of the parties are given by the following table, where the first value in each ordered pair is the utility of P 0 on the specified outcome, and the second is the utility P 1 :
We will make the assumption that parties prefer to output the correct answer rather than an incorrect answer, and otherwise prefer that the other party outputs an incorrect answer; that is, we assume b 0 > a 0 ≥ d 0 ≥ c 0 (and analogously for P 1 's utilities). In [2] it is assumed that the parties' utilities are symmetric, with
, and c 0 = c 1 = −1; we consider more general utility functions here.
Execution in the Ideal World
Our ideal world includes a trusted third party who computes f with complete fairness. This defines a natural game that proceeds as follows:
1. Inputs x 0 and x 1 are sampled according to a joint probability distribution D over input pairs. Then x 0 (resp., x 1 ) is given to P 0 (resp., P 1 ).
2. Each player sends an input to the trusted third party. We also allow parties to send a special input ⊥ denoting an abort. Let x 0 (resp., x 1 ) denote the value sent by P 0 (resp., P 1 ).
3. If x 0 =⊥ or x 1 =⊥, the trusted party sends ⊥ to both parties. Otherwise, the trusted party sends f 0 (x 0 , x 1 ) to P 0 , and f 1 (x 0 , x 1 ) to P 1 . Note that complete fairness is always ensured.
4. Each party outputs some value, and obtains a utility that depends on whether the parties' outputs are correct or not. (We stress that correctness is defined with respect to the "real" inputs x 0 , x 1 , not the effective inputs x 0 , x 1 .)
In the fail-stop setting, we restrict x 0 ∈ {x 0 , ⊥} and x 1 ∈ {x 1 , ⊥}. In the Byzantine setting we allow x 0 , x 1 to be arbitrary. The "desired" play in this game is for each party to send its input to the trusted third party, and then output the value returned by the trusted party. To fully define this "honest" strategy, however, we must specify what each party does for every possible value (including ⊥) it receives from the trusted third party. We formally define strategy (cooperate, W 0 ) for P 0 as follows: P 0 sends its input x 0 to the trusted party. If the trusted party returns anything other than ⊥, then P 0 outputs that value. If the trusted party returns ⊥, then P 0 generates output according to the distribution W 0 (x 0 ).
The strategy (cooperate, W 1 ) for P 1 is defined analogously. The situation in which P 0 plays (cooperate, W 0 ) and P 1 plays (cooperate, W 1 ) is a (Bayesian) strict Nash equilibrium if every (allowed 3 ) deviation that has x 0 = x 0 with nonzero probability results in a strictly lower expected utility for P 0 , and analogously for P 1 . (The expectation is computed over the distribution of the other party's input.) Since the utility obtained by P 0 when the honest strategies are followed is exactly a 0 , this means that the honest strategies form a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium if, for every possible input x 0 of P 0 , the expected utility of P 0 is strictly less than a 0 if it sends any (allowed) x 0 = x 0 to the third party (and similarly for P 1 ).
Note that as long as both parties follow honest strategies, W 0 and W 1 are irrelevant (as they are never used). They are important, however, insofar as they serve as "empty threats" in case of an abort by the other party: namely, P 0 knows that if he aborts then P 1 will determine its own output according to W 1 (x 1 ), and so P 0 must take this into account when deciding whether to abort or not. We now define what it means for the parties to have an incentive to compute f . As discussed in the Introduction, we require the Nash equilibrium to be strict in order to ensure that the parties have some incentive to use the trusted party in the expected way to compute the function. If carrying out the computation with the trusted party is only a Nash (but not strict Nash) equilibrium, then the parties may be indifferent between using the trusted party and just guessing the output on their own.
The setting of Asharov et al. [2] . For completeness, we show that the setting considered by Asharov et al. is not incentive compatible. Recall that Asharov et al. fix the utilities such that (1) getting the correct answer while the other party outputs an incorrect answer gives utility 1; (2) getting an incorrect answer while the other party outputs the correct answer gives utility −1; and (3) gives utility 0 to both parties. On the other hand, if P 0 aborts and outputs a random bit, then regardless of the guessing strategy W 1 employed by P 1 , we see that P 0 and P 1 are each correct with independent probability 1/2 and so the expected utility of P 0 remains 0. This is an allowed deviation that results in no change to the expected utility, and thus there cannot be a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium for this scenario.
In contrast, if the utilities are modified so that when both parties get the correct answer they each obtain utility 1/2 (and everything else is left unchanged), then the setting is incentive compatible. To see this, let W 0 , W 1 be the strategies that output a random bit. Playing (cooperate, W 0 ), (cooperate, W 1 ) now gives utility 1/2 to both parties. If P 0 instead aborts, then -no matter how P 0 determines its output -both P 0 and P 1 are correct with independent probability 1/2. (Recall that P 1 is assumed to guess according to W 1 when we consider possible deviations by P 0 .) The expected utility of deviating is 1/8, which is strictly smaller than 1/2; thus, the strategy vector (cooperate, W 0 ), (cooperate, W 1 ) is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium. Our results will imply that a rational fair protocol can be constructed for this setting, in contrast to what the negative results of [2] might suggest.
Execution in the Real World
In the real world there is no trusted party, and the players instead must communicate in order to compute f . We thus have a real-world game in which inputs x 0 and x 1 are jointly sampled according to D; then x 0 (resp., x 1 ) is given to P 0 (resp., P 1 ); the parties each execute some strategy and then decide on their respective outputs. The goal here is to construct some protocol Π such that running the protocol is a (computational) Nash equilibrium. The running times of the parties, as well as the protocol itself, are parameterized in terms of a security parameter n; however, the function f as well as the parties' utilities are fixed and independent of n. We will only consider protocols Π where correctness holds with all but negligible probability; namely, we assume that if Π is executed honestly on any inputs x 0 , x 1 and security parameter n, then the output of the protocol is f (x 0 , x 1 ) except with probability negligible in n.
As in the ideal world, we again consider two types of deviations. In the fail-stop setting, each party follows the protocol Π as directed except that it may choose to abort at any point. Upon aborting, a party may output whatever value it likes (and need not output the value prescribed by the protocol). We stress that in the fail-stop setting a party is assumed not to change its input when running the protocol. In the Byzantine setting, parties may behave arbitrarily (and, in particular, may run the protocol using a different input). In either setting, we will only be interested in players whose strategies can be implemented in probabilistic polynomial-time.
We now define what it means for Π to induce a game-theoretic equilibrium. We consider computational Nash equilibria, rather than computational strict Nash equilibria, since the latter are notoriously difficult to define; in any case, the goal of our work is only to construct real-world protocols that induce a Nash equilibrium. (We define strict Nash equilibria in the ideal world only because we use it for our results.) The following definition is equivalent to (a generalized version of) the definition used by Asharov et al. [2, Definition 4.6] . f , a distribution D, and utilities for the parties, and fix a (polynomial-time) protocol Π computing f . We say Π is a rational fair protocol (with respect to these parameters) in the fail-stop (resp., Byzantine) setting if running the protocol a Bayesian computational Nash equilibrium in the game defined above.
Definition 2 Fix
For example, if we let Π 1 denote the algorithm that honestly implements P 1 's role in Π, then Π is a rational fair protocol in the fail-stop setting if for all ppt fail-stop algorithms A 0 there is a negligible function µ such that the expected utility of A 0 (1 n ) (when running against Π 1 (1 n )) is at most a 0 + µ(n) (and analogously for deviations by P 1 ). We stress that if A 0 aborts here, then P 1 determines its output as directed by Π 1 .
Note that it makes no sense to speak of Π being a rational fair protocol without regard to some input distribution and utilities for the parties. In particular, it is possible for Π to be rationally for for one set of utilities but not another.
Positive Results for Rational Fair Computation
We show broad positive results for rational fair computation in both the fail-stop and Byzantine settings. Specifically, we show that whenever computing the function honestly is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium in the ideal world, then there exists a protocol Π computing f such that running Π is a Bayesian computational Nash equilibrium in the real world.
Our protocols all share a common structure. As in prior work on fairness (in the cryptographic setting) [12, 28, 14] , our protocols have two stages. The first stage is a "pre-processing" step that uses any protocol for (standard) secure two-party computation, and the second stage takes place in a sequence of n iterations. In our work, the stages have the following form: Second stage: For n iterations, each consisting of two rounds, the parties alternate sending shares to each other. In the ith iteration, P 1 sends t 0 i to P 0 , enabling P 0 to learn r 0 i ; then P 0 sends s 1 i to P 1 , enabling P 1 to learn r 1 i . When the protocol ends (either through successful termination or the other party aborting) a party outputs the most-recently-learned r i .
The key difference with respect to prior work is how we set the distribution of the {r b i } for i < i * . Here we use the assumption that f, D, and the utilities are incentive compatible, and thus there are "guessing strategies" W 0 (x 0 ) and W 1 (x 1 ) for the parties (in case the other party aborts) that are in equilibrium (see Section 2.1). We use exactly these distributions in our protocol.
The Fail-Stop Setting
We first present an analysis of the fail-stop setting. Recall that we let W 0 (resp., W 1 ) denote the distribution that P 0 (resp., P 1 ) uses to determine its output in the ideal world in case P 1 (resp., P 0 ) aborts, where this distribution may depend on P 0 's input x 0 (resp., P 1 's input x 1 ). We say W 0 has full support if for every x 0 the distribution W 0 (x 0 ) puts non-zero probability on every element in the range of f ; we define this notion analogously for W 1 . We begin with a technical claim. Proof We focus on the fail-stop setting, though the proof follows along the same lines for the Byzantine case. Incentive compatibility implies that there exist W 0 , W 1 such that the strategy vector (cooperate, W 0 ), (cooperate, W 1 ) is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium. Distributions W 0 , W 1 may not have full support, but we show that they can be modified so that they do. Specifically, we simply modify each distribution so that with some sufficiently small probability it outputs a uniform element from the range of f . Details follow.
Lemma 1 Fix a function f , a distribution D, and utilities for the parties that are incentive compatible in the fail
When P 0 and P 1 cooperate and both output the correct answer, P 0 obtains utility a 0 . Consider now some input x 0 for P 0 , and let u * 0 (x 0 ) denote the maximum utility P 0 can obtain if it aborts on input x 0 . (Recall that when P 0 aborts, P 1 chooses its output according to W 1 (x 1 ). Here, P 0 knows W 1 as well as the marginal distribution of x 1 conditioned on P 0 's input x 0 .) Because cooperating is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium, we must have u * 0 (x 0 ) < a 0 . Define
(the maximum is taken over all x that have non-zero probability as input to P 0 ); i.e., u * 0 denotes the highest expected utility P 0 can hope to obtain when aborting on some input. Define u * 1 analogously with respect to deviations by P 1 . Set
We define a distribution W 0 (x 0 ) as follows: with probability λ output a uniform element from the range of f , and with probability (1 − λ) choose an output according to W 0 (x 0 ); define W 1 similarly.
Functionality ShareGen
Inputs: ShareGen takes as input a value x 0 from P 0 and a value x 1 from P 1 . If either input is invalid, then ShareGen simply outputs ⊥ to both parties.
Computation: Proceed as follows:
1. Choose i * according to a geometric distribution with parameter p. Note that W 0 and W 1 have full support. We claim that (cooperate, W 0 ), (cooperate, W 1 ) is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium. To see this, assume the contrary; thus, without loss of generality, there is an input x 0 such that P 0 can obtain expected utility at least a 0 by aborting on input x 0 . (Note that now P 1 chooses its output according to W 1 (x 1 ) when P 0 aborts.) But then, by following the same strategy, P 0 can obtain utility at least a 0 − λ · (b 0 − c 0 ) when playing against a P 1 who chooses his output according to
Set the values of
0 , this is a contradiction to the way u * 0 was defined.
Theorem 1 Fix a function f , a distribution D, and utilities for the parties. If these are incentive compatible in the fail-stop setting, then (assuming the existence of general secure two-party computation for semi-honest adversaries) there exists a protocol Π computing f such that Π is a rational fair protocol (with respect to the same distribution and utilities) in the fail-stop setting.
Proof By definition of incentive compatibility, there exist distributions W 0 , W 1 (that can depend on x 0 and x 1 , respectively) for which the strategy profile (cooperate, W 0 ), (cooperate, W 1 ) is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 1, we may assume that W 0 and W 1 both have full support. We define a functionality ShareGen (cf. Figure 1 ) that is based on these distributions; this functionality is parameterized by a real number p > 0 that we will set later. We define our protocol Π, that uses ShareGen as a building block, in Figure 2 . Since p is a constant (independent of n), we have i * ≤ n with all but negligible probability and hence when Π is run honestly then both parties obtain the correct answer with all but negligible probability. In the analysis it is easiest to simply assume that i * ≤ n. Since this fails to hold with only negligible probability it does not affect our proof that the protocol is a computational Nash equilibrium; alternately, one could simply modify ShareGen to enforce that i * ≤ n always (namely, by setting i * = n in case i * > n).
We will analyze Π in a hybrid world where there is a trusted entity computing ShareGen on behalf of the parties. One can show (following [5] ) that if Π is a computational Nash equilibrium in this hybrid world, then so is Π when executed in the real world (with a secure protocol imple- Output: Players determine their outputs as follows:
• If P 1−i aborts before P i has computed any r i value, then P i chooses its output according to W i (x i ).
• If P 1−i aborts at any other point, or the protocol completes successfully, then no more messages are sent and P i outputs the last r i value it received. menting ShareGen). Once we have moved to this hybrid world, we may in fact take the parties to be computationally unbounded.
Our goal is to show that there exists a p > 0 for which Π (in the hybrid world described above) is a rational fair protocol. We first observe that there are no profitable deviations for a fail-stop P 1 ; this is because P 0 always "gets the output first" in every iteration. (More formally, say P 1 aborts after receiving its iteration-i message. If i ≥ i * then P 0 will output the correct answer and so P 1 cannot possibly get utility greater than a 1 . If i < i * then P 0 has no information beyond what it could compute from its input x 1 , and P 0 will generate output according to W 0 (x 0 ); by incentive compatibility, P 1 will obtain utility strictly lower than a 1 regardless of how it determines its output.) We are thus left with the more difficult case of analyzing deviations by P 0 .
Before continuing, it is helpful to introduce two modifications to the protocol that can only increase P 0 's utility. First, in each iteration i we tell P 0 whether i * < i. One can easily see that P 0 cannot increase its utility by aborting when i * < i, and so the interesting case to analyze is whether P 0 can improve its utility by aborting when i * ≥ i. Second, if P 0 ever decides to abort the protocol in some iteration i (with i * ≥ i), then we tell P 0 whether i * = i before P 0 generates its output. (P 0 is not, however, allowed to change its decision to abort.) So, let us fix some input x 0 for P 0 , and consider some iteration i < n. Say P 0 has just learned that r i = y (for some y in the range of f ) and is told that i * ≥ i. If P 0 does not abort, but instead runs the protocol honestly to the end, then it obtains utility a 0 . If P 0 aborts, then with some probability α it learns that i * = i; in that case, P 0 may possibly get utility b 0 . Otherwise, with probability 1 − α it learns that i * > i. In this latter case, P 0 has no information beyond what it could compute from its input, and P 1 will output a value distributed according to W 1 (x 1 ); hence, incentive compatibility implies that the maximum expected utility of P 0 is u * 0 < a 0 . (This u * 0 is the same as defined in the proof of Lemma 1; for our purposes all that is important is that u * 0 is strictly less than a 0 .) That is, the expected utility of aborting is at most α
implying that P 0 has no incentive to deviate. We show that p can be set such that (1) holds.
where the minimum is taken over all inputs x 0 for P 0 and all y in the range of f . Since W 0 has full support, we have q > 0. We thus have:
and we see that by setting
we ensure that (1) holds. We stress that the right-hand side of this inequality is a constant, independent of n.
Assuming p is set as just discussed, the above analysis shows that in any iteration i < n and for any value r i = y received by P 0 in that iteration, P 0 has no incentive to abort. (In fact, P 0 has strict incentive not to abort.) The only remaining case to analyze is when i = n. In this case it would indeed be advantageous for P 0 to abort when i * ≥ i; however, this occurs with only negligible probability and so does not impact the fact that we have a computational Nash equilibrium (which is insensitive to negligible changes in the utility).
Although security notions other than fairness are not the focus of our work, we note that the protocol Π presented in the proof of the previous theorem is private in addition to being rationally fair. That is, the parties learn the function output only, but nothing else regarding the other party's input. We omit formal definitions and the straightforward proof.
The Byzantine Setting
We next consider the Byzantine setting, where in the ideal world a deviating party can change the input it sends to the trusted third party (or may choose to abort, as before), and in the real world a deviating party may behave arbitrarily.
The protocol and proof of fairness in the Byzantine setting are similar to those of the fail-stop setting. We must modify our protocol to ensure that it will work in the Byzantine setting. In particular, we require ShareGen to now apply a message-authentication code (MAC) to each s b i and t b i value so that parties can detect if these values have been modified. The remaining issue to deal with is the effect of changing inputs; however, we show that if incentive compatibility holds -so parties have disincentive to change their inputs in the ideal world -then parties have no incentive to change their inputs in the real world either. Proof By definition of incentive compatibility, there exist distributions W 0 , W 1 (that can depend on x 0 and x 1 , respectively) for which the strategy profile (cooperate, W 0 ), (cooperate, W 1 ) is a Bayesian strict Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 1, we may assume that W 0 and W 1 both have full support. We define a protocol Π based on a functionality ShareGen (cf. Figures 3 and 4) , where the latter is parameterized by a real number p > 0. These are largely identical to the protocols used in the proof of Theorem 1, with the exception that the secret shares exchanged by the parties are authenticated by a message-authentication code (MAC) as part of the computation of ShareGen, and the resulting tags are verified by the parties (as part of Π). For our proof, we assume the MAC being used is an information-theoretically secure, n-time MAC; a computationally-secure MAC would also be fine, however. Since p is a constant (independent of n), it is again easy to check that correctness holds with all but negligible probability. As in the proof of Theorem 1, in our analysis we assume that i * ≤ n always and this does not affect our results.
The proof that Π is rationally fair in the Byzantine setting is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, and we assume familiarity with that proof here. Once again, we analyze Π in a hybrid world where there is a trusted entity computing ShareGen on behalf of the parties. We also ignore the possibility of a MAC forgery, and treat a party who sends a different share/tag from the one it received from ShareGen as if that party had simply aborted. This is justified by the fact that a successful forgery occurs with only negligible probability.
Our goal, as in the proof of Theorem 1, is to show that there exists a p > 0 for which Π (in the hybrid world described above, and ignoring the possibility of a MAC forgery) is a rational fair protocol. As in the preceding proof, there are again no profitable deviations for P 1 . Note that here, P 1 may either abort early or change its input to ShareGen. The former does not help because P 0 always "gets the output first" in every iteration; incentive compatibility in the Byzantine setting implies that the latter -whether in combination with aborting early or not -cannot help, either.
We are thus left with analyzing deviations by P 0 . We again introduce two modifications to the Output: Players determine their outputs as follows:
• If P 1−i aborts at any other point, or the protocol completes successfully, then no more messages are sent and P i outputs the last r i value it received. protocol that can only increase P 0 's utility. First, in each iteration i we tell P 0 whether i * < i. It follows immediately from incentive compatibility that P 0 cannot increase its utility by aborting when i * < i (regardless of what input it sends to ShareGen), and so we assume that P 0 never does so. Second, if P 0 ever decides to abort the protocol in some iteration i, then we tell P 0 whether i * = i before P 0 generates its output. (P 0 is not, however, allowed to change its decision to abort.)
There are two cases to analyze: either P 0 sends its actual input x 0 to ShareGen, or P 0 sends a different input x 0 =⊥. In the former case, the analysis is exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem 1, and one can show that p can be set such that P 0 has no incentive to abort the protocol at any point. It remains to show that, in the second case, P 0 can never increase its expected utility beyond a 0 , i.e., the utility it would obtain if it ran the protocol honestly using its actual input x 0 .
If P 0 substitutes its input and then runs the protocol to the end, then (by incentive compatibility) P 0 's expected utility is strictly less than a 0 . Can P 0 do better by aborting early? Fix some input x 0 for P 0 , let x 0 =⊥ be the input that P 0 sends to the trusted entity computing ShareGen, and consider some iteration i < n. (The case of i = n is handled as in the proof of Theorem 1.) Say P 0 has just learned that r i = y (for some y in the range of f ) and is told that i * ≥ i. If P 0 aborts, then with some probability α it learns that i * = i; in that case, P 0 may possibly get utility b 0 . Otherwise, with probability 1 − α it learns that i * > i. In this latter case, P 0 has no information beyond what it could compute from its input, and P 1 will output a value distributed according to W 1 (x 1 ); hence, incentive compatibility implies that the maximum expected utility of P 0 is u * 
Conclusions and Future Work
Given the stark impossibility results for fairness in a purely malicious context [6] , it is natural to understand whether, or to what extent, fairness is achievable in a rational context. Recent work of Asharov et al. [2] had appeared to give a negative answer to this question, showing a specific case where rational fairness cannot be achieved (if correctness better than 1/2 is desired). Our work, in contrast, shows broad feasibility results for rational fairness: roughly, we show that whenever computing the function is a strict Nash equilibrium in the ideal world, then it is possible to construct a rational fair protocol computing the function in the real world.
Within the broader context of research at the intersection of game theory and cryptography, our result can be interpreted in two ways:
• We show a new setting in which cryptographic impossibility results can be circumvented by assuming rational behavior. Viewed in this light, our results can be seen as a strong generalization of the extensive line of work on rational secret sharing.
• Given a "fairness game" defined in an ideal world where there is a trusted entity (i.e., a "mediator") computing some function on behalf of the parties, a natural question to ask is when a game-theoretic equilibrium in the ideal world can be implemented via a real-world protocol. While we do not provide a complete answer to this question, we show a partial characterization: roughly, whenever there is a strict Nash equilibrium in the ideal world, there is a protocol that induces a computational Nash equilibrium in the real world.
Our work suggests several interesting directions for future research. First, it would be interesting to prove a converse of our result. Fix some f , a distribution on the inputs, and utility functions for the parties. We conjecture that if there exists a rational fair protocol Π for computing f (with respect to this distribution and utilities) in the Byzantine setting, then either f can be computed with complete fairness, or else incentive compatibility holds (in the Byzantine setting).
It will also be interesting to explore stronger game-theoretic solution concepts in the real world. We construct real-world protocols that induce a computational Nash equilibrium, but one could also aim to construct protocols satisfying some of the stronger equilibrium notions proposed, e.g., in [17, 22, 23, 11] .
Finally, one could consider even more complex settings of the players' utilities, e.g., where the utilities depend on the true output and the actual output of the parties and not just on whether the outputs are correct or incorrect. This would model situations where being "closer" to the right answer is better, or where some answers are more important to get right than others.
